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Ar.my tactical commanders in the future will have assured access 
to satellite communications systems that can be operational 
within 72 hours throughout the world. 
IN'l'RODUC'l'ION 
Global changes and 
fiscal realities have resulted 
in a fundamental change to our 
country's National Military 
Strategy. The National 
Military Strategy for the 
1990s will increasingly rely 
on our capability to project 
joint forces combat power. A 
force which is at least 25 per 
cent smaller and based 
primarily in the United 
States, will require the need 
to be versatile and easily 
tailorable to accomplish a 
wide range of military 
operations. These forces will 
require the ability to 
assemble and move great 
distances, often with little 
or no warning. 
With the changes to the 
National Military Strategy 
from a forward deployed linear 
European force to a U.S. based 
force having global 
contingency responsibilities, 
requires rapid, reliable, 
beyond line of sight 
communications both enroute 
and in a theater of 
operations. Rapid launch, 
assured access, tactical 
satellite communications 
uniquely provide this 
capability. 
ARMY WARFIGB'l'ING DOC'l'RINE 
The Army's future 
warfighting doctrine, "AirLand 
Operations" envisions a much 
larger battlefield with 
reduced and highly dispersed 
forces. Battle in Airland 
Operations will not occur 
until enemy forces are 
significantly attrited by 
precision deep fire weapons. 
Unlike the previous 
warfighting doctrine, entire 
pieces of terrain will not be 
seized and held. Only key 
pieces of terrain will be 
held. The AirLand Operations 
forces will operate in a non-
linear, highly mobile 
battlefield, requiring instant 
and constant "communications 
on the move" at dynamic, 
beyond line of sight 
distances. Successful 
execution of AirLand 
Operations requires assured 
access, robust, secure, anti-
jam tactical satellite systems 
that can support the tactical 
commander's command and 
control, intelligence and 
logistics requirements. 
Unlike current Army tactical 
satellite communications, 
where the bulk of satellite 
communications is at Corps and 
Divisions, successful AirLand 
Operations require assured 
access satellite 
communications at all echelons 
on the battlefield. 
CURRENT TACTICAL 
COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE 
The Army's current 
tactical command and control 
architecture is the Army 
Tactical Command and Control 
System (ATCCS). The ATCCS 
architecture consists of three 
communications systems and 
computer systems serving 
five battlefield 
functional areas of the 
tactical Army; Air Defense, 
Maneuver, Intelligence, Combat 
Support, and Fire Support. 
The communications system 
serving these battlefield 
functional areas consists of 
an Area Common User System 
(ACUS), the Combat Network 
Radio (CNR) , and the Army Data 
Distribution System. These 
systems were designed 
primarily to serve a smaller, 
denser, non-dispersed 
battlefield with limited 
mobility requirements. The 
ATCCS architecture employs 
limited tactical satellite 
communications in the ACUS and 
CNR segment of the ATCCS 
architecture. 
The bulk of tactical 
communications is carried by 
the Mobile Subscriber 
Equipment (MSE) System. MSE 
is a circuit switched digital 
cellular radio system. MSE 
was designed to support 
approximately 10,000 users 
(8000 wireline/2000 mobile) in 
a Corps area 150 X 250 miles. 
An Army Corps consists of over 
100,000 soldiers. As we move 
to AirLand Operations, the 
Corps area increases to 400 X 
1000 miles. These users will 
be highly mobile and widely 
dispersed. Additionally, 
since ownership of terrain 
will be questionable, 
especially hilltops, the 
connectivity becomes greatly 
jeopardized for terrestrial 
systems. Satellite 
communications will uniquely 
solve this dynamic MSE 
connectivity problem. 
The existing Mil ary 
Satellite Communications 
(MILSATCOM) System that 
provides satellite 
communications to the services 
is inadequate to support 
AirLand Operations. The 
current MILSATCOM System 
consists primarily three 
systems; the Super High 
Frequency (SHF) Defense 
Satellite Communications 
System (DSCS), the Ultra High 
Frequency (UHF) Fleet 
Satellite Communications 
Systems (FLTSAT) System, and 
the UHF Air Force Satellite 
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Communications (AFSATCOM) 
System. DSCS provides for the 
greatest transmission capacity 
with some anti-jam capability. 
The FLTSAT and AFSATCOM 
systems have significantly 
less capacity, with no anti-
jam capability. The Army has 
approximately 200 DSCS Ground 
Mobile Forces (GMF) terminals 
and over 3500 UHF manportable 
terminals. The GMF terminals 
are large and use eight or 20 
foot dishes. These terminals 
are doctrinally found at 
Echelon above Corps (EAC) , 
Corps and Division. The Army, 
Navy and Air Force share these 
systems with the National 
Command Authority, Commanders 
in Chief, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and other government 
agencies. 
DESERT STORM SATELLITE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Access to MILSATCOM 
systems is determined on a 
priority basis. Prior to 
Desert Shield/Storm, the low 
priority of the tactical users 
at theater and below resulted 
in minimal use of MILSATCOM 
for peacetime training or 
operational situations. In 
Desert Shield/Storm, the 
tactical user priority was 
recognized and MILSATCOM 
service was provided from all 
available resources, to 
included commercial resources. 
However, due to the extensive 
satellite communications 
requirements, MILSATCOM and 
commercial services could not 
satisfy the multitude of 
requirements. At the start of 
Desert Shield the CENTCOM 
satellite usage was very 
limited. Once Desert Storm 
operations started, satellite 
usage increased over 100-fold. 
In excess of 1500 satellite 
terminals were deployed to 
theater, of which over 75 
percent were single channel 
manportable military and 
commercial units. Despite the 
limited capacity and self 
interference problems, single 
channel terminals were used 
for command and control from 
EAC down through Corps and 
Division levels. Fifty 
percent of the satellite 
communications traffic was 
carried by over 100 DSCS GMF 
terminals. Large commercial 
INTELSAT terminals provided 
another 25 percent. The 
remaining 25 percent included 
FLTSAT, AFSATCOM, and 
commercial INMARSAT. The 
satellite usage requirements 
were for both inter and intra-
theater communications. 
Intra-theater satellite 
communications were especially 
important because of the vast 
operational area in which 
there did not already exist a 
communications infrastructure. 
Key Lessons learned from 
Desert Storm, which would 
apply to expected future 
scenarios, is that there was 
insufficient satellite 
communications capac y and 
existing terminals are too 
large to support the mobile 
tactical commander. 
FU'l'URE TACTICAL 
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 
To meet the recognized 
requirements of the Army 
tactical commander for AirLand 
Operations, the Army has been 
aggressively pursuing assured 
access satellite 
communications in both the 
satellite and terminal 
environments. To support the 
tactical Army's satellite 
communications requirements, 
the Combined Arms Command Army 
Space Institute and the Army 
Signal Center have developed 
an Army Tactical Satellite 
Communications Mission Needs 
Statement. 
The future Army wartime 
communications architecture, 
now being developed by the 
Army Signal Center, requires 
three to four thousand 2.4 
Kbps low data rate (LDR) 
secure, anti-jam, manportable 
terminals and over 300 secure, 
anti-jam, 1-1.5 Mbps medium 
data rate (MDR) terminals. 
LDR terminals would support a 
rough order of magnitude of 
75-150 required single channel 
nets in a two Corps theater of 
operations. LDR manportable 
terminals must be less than 
twelve pounds, with a desired 
set-up/tear-down time of less 
than five minutes. The MDR 
terminals must be highly 
mobile and use less than 4.5 
foot diameter dishes, with a 
set-up/tear-down time of less 
than 30 minutes. Rough order 
of magnitude throughput 
requirements for the MDR 
terminals are 20 Mbps, using 
50 MDR terminals in a two 
Corps theater of operations. 
The MDR two Corps theater of 
operations would provide 
connectivity for roughly 15 
highly dispersed enclaves. 
Approximately 90 percent of 
the LDR terminals are to be 
used by Divisions and Special 
Operations Forces for command 
and control. The remaining 
ten percent will be located at 
Corps headquarters, Corps 
artillery brigades, and Corps 
armored cavalry regiments. 
The MDR terminals are to be 
used to support "range 
extension" for the MSE system 
to provide the needed 
connectivity on the much 
larger battlefield. These 
terminals will be located at 
Corps and Division. 
To support these 
terminals with assured access 
communications, the Army has 
been actively involved in two 
satellite communications 
programs; the DoD MILSTAR 
Program, and the Army's 
Lightweight Tactical Satellite 
Communications System (LTASS). 
With Congress redirecting 
MILSTAR to support the 
tactical commander, the Army 
considers MILS TAR to be the 
primary tactical satellite 
communications backbone 
support of the future. 
However, because of rainfall 
and foliage attenuation 
characteristics of EHF, the 
Army will continue to need 
assured access UHF and SHF 
communications in many areas 
of the world. Initial MILSTAR 
satellites are to provide only 
LDR capabil ies with MDR 
capabilities not to be 
available until near the turn 
of the century. 
To provide primary 
service in certain parts of 
the world and to augment the 
MILSTAR constellation in 
theater of operations where 
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additional capacity will be 
required, the Army last year 
approved the Army LTASS 
program. The LTASS will 
provide this additional 
coverage capability, surge 
capability, and augmentation 
capacity. For both MILSTAR 
and LTASS, assured access 
communications by the tactical 
commander is imperative. 
The Communications 
Electronics Command (CECOM) 
Center for Space Systems is 
the Army's developer for the 
LTASS. CECOM Center for Space 
is expected to conduct a joint 
demonstration launch with the 
Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) in 
1994 of it's lightweight 
tactical satellite 
communications system. The 
LTASS is an evolutionary 
technology demonstration of 
rapid launch EHF payloads. 
The initial launch is 
projected to provide one MDR 
channel with 32 LDR channels 
launched into an elliptical or 
geosynchronous orbit. The 
follow-on satellite is 
projected to be launched after 
1997 and provide additional 
MDR and LDR channels. 
The rapid launch vehicles 
expected to be used are the 
Pegasus and Taurus. The rapid 
launch capability provides a 
deterrent against an enemy 
antisatellite capability. The 
Taurus will provide rapid 
ground launch of 500 pounds 
into a geosynchronous or 12 
hour elliptical orbit. The 
Taurus launch capability is 
expected to be available after 
1997. 
The Pegasus is air launched 
from a B-52, and capable of 
launching 280 pounds into an 
elliptical orbit. The Pegasus 
could be launched and provide 
operational capability within 
72 hours to any theater in the 
world. Three to four 
lightsats launched into an 
elliptical orbit could provide 
theater commanders continuous 
coverage in an area of 
operations. 
SUHMARY 
The future AirLand 
Operations Army will require a 
different communications 
architecture than previously 
used. Assured access, anti-
jam, mobile communications, 
throughout the dispersed and 
dynamic battlefield is 
imperative to making AirLand 
Operations successful. 
Satellite communications, with 
small, lightweight terminals, 
will become an integral part 
of this communications 
architecture. The Army is 
actively pursuing this change. 
